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cooperation.”
This mechanism allows a group of like-minded member states to pursue legislation if the required unanimous
support is not achievable.
EU member states recently used the reinforced cooperation mechanism for only the second time to overcome a
dispute on an EU-wide patent that had been held up for years because of a controversy about languages.

Tax Policy: Business Groups Urge Geithner to Retain Opposition to Financial Transactions Tax
With the financial ministers of the Group of 20 largest economies meeting to discuss fiscal shortfalls a few
blocks away, major business groups on Sept. 22 urged Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner to continue
opposing European efforts to convince other world economies to adopt a financial transactions tax.
In a letter to Geithner, business groups including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable,
and the National Association for Manufacturers said taxing every financial market transaction would do harm to
investors and businesses, and eventually the overall economy.
“A transaction tax will cycle through the entire U.S. economy, harming both investors, and businesses. A
number of studies have shown that a [financial transactions tax] will impede the efficiency of markets, impair
depth and liquidity, raise costs to issuers, investors, and pensioners, and distort capital flows by discriminating
against asset classes,” the groups said.
Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the European Commission have all proposed
various types of taxes on their financial services industries, but there is concern that taxing financial transactions
in only one economy will result in a shift in business to another major economy that does not adopt such a tax.
As a result, the governments of Germany and France have taken the lead in urging all G-20 nations to adopt
financial transactions taxes as a way to raise revenues and discourage speculative trading (97 BBR 406,
9/13/11).
Administration's Alternative to Tax
The Obama administration has resisted taxes on individual financial transactions, although it has proposed a
Financial Responsibility Fee that would be paid by the nation's largest banks to help the government recoup any
losses related to the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
The $90 billion proposal was met with strong resistance by both Republicans and Democrats in Congress and
has not moved forward.
As G-20 financial officials meet at the International Monetary Fund to discuss concerns about financial market
conditions in Europe and austerity plans in debt-ridden nations, the business groups opted to remind U.S.
officials of their concerns about financial transaction taxes.
“In light of the current fragile state of the global markets and the economy, and with many economies
experiencing high levels of unemployment and sluggish recoveries, the imposition of such a tax would be
particularly harmful,” the groups said in their letter.
“Major economies that have adopted a FTT and FTT-like initiatives have had overwhelmingly negative results,
including reduced asset prices, trading moving to other venues, market dislocation, and a decrease in liquidity.”
For More Information
Text of the business groups' letter to Geithner is available at http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=8589935
595.
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By Hilary J. Allen
Hilary J. Allen is Assistant Professor of Law at Loyola University New Orleans College of Law. Her full article
“Cocos Can Drive Markets Cuckoo” will be published in the forthcoming edition of the Lewis & Clark Law
Review. A draft of the article can be accessed at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1917760.
The last few months have seen a dramatic fall in the value of bank stocks both in Europe and the U.S., bringing
back unpleasant memories of the depths of the financial crisis in 2008. Concerns about the sovereign debt crisis
in Europe, continuing litigation relating to the American subprime mortgage crisis, and the generally poor state
of the world economy have increasingly put banks under pressure. However, some commentators have pointed
out the “silver lining” in all of this: the big American and European banks are better capitalized than they were
during the financial crisis, and therefore are better able to absorb these shocks and less likely to fail. 1 Part of
the reason that banks have increased their capital cushions is in anticipation of the new regulatory capital
requirements that are being phased in by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the “BCBS”) as part of
Basel III.
1 Andreas Dombret, an executive member of the board of the German central bank, was quoted as saying “We are very far
away from the situation we witnessed in 2008 … European banks, in general, have considerably improved their capital
base, making them less vulnerable to financial strains.” See Jack Ewing, Doubts Still Harbored About Europe's Banks, N. Y.
Times (August 25, 2011) (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/business/global/gaps-remain-ingirding-europes-banks.html?pagewanted=1&ref=business).

In December 2010, the BCBS indicated that global systemically important banks (“GSIBs”) should be required to
hold capital in excess of that required of other banks, but did not provide any concrete detail regarding this
requirement (instead, the BCBS noted that it would continue to work on this issue through the first half of 2011).
2 Initially, it seemed that the BCBS would allow GSIBs to satisfy their additional capital requirements with a
form of contingent capital that has come to be known as “cocos.” In June of this year, the BCBS disappointed
many GSIBs when it indicated that they would not be able to do so 3 – instead, the additional capital would
need to be in the form of common equity. 4 In July of this year, the BCBS released a consultative document
that reiterated its conclusion that cocos should not be used to satisfy the GSIBs' additional capital requirements.
5 But while the BCBS's ardor for cocos seems to have cooled, banks remain interested. The general
consensus among banks seems to be that cocos, which are a hybrid debt-equity instrument, are the best of
both worlds: cheaper than equity, but more loss-absorbent than debt. However, in their support for cocos, banks
seem to have overlooked the potential for cocos to cause behaviors that jeopardize confidence in banks just
when banks need that confidence most.
2 BCBS, Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems (December 2010).
3 For example, Daniel Bell of Bank of America Merrill Lynch made the following comment in response to the BCBS's
decision: “Given investor demand for the product is on the up, it is unfortunate that contingent capital will play a smaller role
than expected.” Helene Durand, Basel pops CoCo market hope, Reuters (June 27, 2011).
4 BCBS, Measures for global systemically important banks agreed by the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision
(June 25, 2011) (available at http://www.bis.org/press/p110625.htm). The BCBS's reservations about cocos stem
largely from the fact that they are untested, and from uncertainty about their nature and form.
5 See BCBS, Global systemically important banks: Assessment methodology and the additional loss absorbency
requirement (July 2011). The additional capital requirements for GSIBs will be phased in from 2016 (the BCBS is currently
consulting on the detail of these requirements). The BCBS takes the view that GSIBs pose more of a threat to the stability of
the global financial system than smaller, local banks: these additional capital requirements are intended to improve stability
by reducing the probability of failure of a GSIB, or failing that, reducing the impact of such failure.

What Exactly Is a Coco?
At the outset, it helps to be clear about what a “coco” actually is. “Coco” is colloquial shorthand for a “contingent
convertible capital instrument.” 6 Essentially, cocos are debt obligations of a bank that will remain debt unless a
contractually pre-defined “trigger event” occurs. 7 In that case, the coco will automatically and irrevocably
convert into equity shares in the bank. There is not yet any concrete consensus about what should constitute a
“trigger event”: some favor a trigger event that can be called by the issuing bank's national supervisor, acting in
its discretion. 8 Some take the view that triggers should be more objective, and be based either on some form
of market indicator (for example, if the issuing bank's stock price drops below a certain specified amount, or the
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issuing bank's credit default swap (CDS) spread increases beyond a certain specified amount) or on the issuing
bank's capital ratio (if that bank's ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets falls below the level required by
regulation or contractual agreement). 9 Though these types of proposed trigger events are all very different,
they do share a key characteristic: they are all low-probability, high-consequence events.
6 Although some people use the term “coco” synonymously with the term “contingent capital”, the consensus seems to be
that cocos are actually just one subset of contingent capital. Another subset of contingent capital includes debt instruments
with a write-down feature.
7 This is more or less the definition of “cocos” used by the IMF: see Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, Jianping Zhou, Vanessa Le Lesle
and Michael Moore, IMF Staff Discussion Note Contingent Capital: Economic Rationale and Design Features (January 25,
2011) at page 4. It should be noted that this definition of “coco” is not universally accepted: the Swiss, for example, use the
term “coco” to describe both instruments that convert into equity and instruments that include a write-down feature. Some
other commentators are imprecise, and do not make it clear whether or not they consider convertible instruments with a
write-down feature to be cocos.
8 For example, the BCBS favors a discretionary trigger. See BCBS, Final elements of the reforms to raise the quality of
regulatory capital issued by the Basel Committee (January 13, 2011) (available at http://www.bis.org/press/p110113.h
tm). The BCBS still sees cocos as playing a role in regulatory capital regimes in countries such as Switzerland, which
require regulatory capital over and above what is mandated by the BCBS. See BCBS, Global systemically important banks:
Assessment methodology and the additional loss absorbency requirement (July 2011).
9 For further discussion and detail on the possible triggers for cocos, see Louise Pitt, Amanda Hindlian, Sandra Lawson and
Charles P. Himmelberg of Goldman Sachs Global Markets Institute, Contingent Capital: Possibilities, problems and
opportunities, (March, 2011), page 6 et seq.; Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, Jianping Zhou, Vanessa Le Lesle and Michael Moore,
IMF Staff Discussion Note Contingent Capital: Economic Rationale and Design Features (January 25, 2011) at page 9.

Another unsettled aspect of cocos is the optimum conversion mechanism: debt will convert to equity upon the
occurrence of a trigger event, but at what rate? The coco could convert to a fixed number of equity shares upon
the occurrence of the trigger event, or it could convert to a fixed value of equity shares. 10 The latter would
require a conversion formula to be included in the coco instrument at the time of issuance: the true conversion
rate would not be known until the trigger event actually occurred.
10 These two options are discussed in more detail in French, Kenneth R., et al., The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the
Financial System, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ at page 55 (2010).

Finally, and very importantly, no one is sure how to properly price the risk of conversion. To some extent, this is
because the instruments are new and markets have not evolved ways of gauging their risk yet. However, the
more fundamental issue with coco pricing is that investors and markets tend to find it inherently difficult to
accurately estimate the risk associated with low-probability, high-impact outcomes, such as the occurrence of a
trigger event. 11 The only certainty is that cocos will need to be priced higher than ordinary bank bonds (which
have no risk of conversion into equity). Investors are likely to be attracted by that extra yield, even if it is an
inaccurate measure of the risk of conversion. 12 All of this begs the question of how a coco holder, who really
just regards cocos as bonds with higher yields, will react in the unlikely event that conversion of their cocos into
equity suddenly seems likely.
11 For a discussion of the difficulty in estimating tail event risk, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 Geo. L.J. 193
(2008) at page 233.
12 Investors in hybrid debt-equity securities generally think of them and treat them as bonds. Thomas A. Humphreys and
Anna T. Pinedo, Is it a bird? A plane? Exploring contingent capital, Butterworths Journal of International Banking and
Finance Law 67 (February 2010) at page 68. The underestimation of the risk of conversion follows from a basic tenet of
behavioral economics: “unrealistic optimism is a pervasive feature of human life; it characterizes most people in most social
categories. When they overestimate their personal immunity from harm, people fail to take preventative steps.” Richard H.
Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge (2009) at 33.

Cocos in a Time of Crisis
Some coco holders will not want to hold equity in the issuing bank: some may not even be permitted to do so.
13 The obvious solution in such a circumstance would be for the coco holder to sell the coco prior to conversion.
To the extent that coco holders are able to sell off cocos in an environment where conversion seems likely, they
are likely to do so at discounted prices. This will depress the market value of the issuing bank's cocos, which
could in turn be seen by the market as a self-validating indicator of problems with the issuing bank. Debt
markets are not always particularly liquid, however, and the coco holder may have difficulty locating a buyer for
the coco. In the absence of a liquid market for the coco, the coco holder may wish to hedge its exposure to the
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issuing bank. Coco holders could do this by shorting the issuing bank's stock, or alternatively, a form of credit
derivative could be tailored to pay the coco holder should conversion occur. If many coco holders, faced with the
impending possibility of conversion, engage in this type of hedging activity, then that will depress the issuing
bank's stock price and drive up the spread on credit derivatives that reference that bank. If the cocos are set to
convert to a variable number of shares (determined by a contractually-set formula), there will be a damaging
incentive structure even for those coco holders who have resigned themselves to holding the bank's stock after
conversion: they will be incentivized to short the issuing bank so as to drive its stock price downwards. The
lower the stock price, the more shares the coco holders will receive upon conversion.
13 Some institutional investors are constrained by investment mandates that do not allow them to hold equity. Louise Pitt,
Amanda Hindlian, Sandra Lawson and Charles P. Himmelberg of Goldman Sachs Global Markets Institute, Contingent
Capital: Possibilities, problems and opportunities, (March, 2011) at page 10. It may be that, because of these mandates,
institutional investors do not invest in cocos at all. Alternatively, the institutional investors may consider the chances of
conversion to equity sufficiently remote that they feel comfortable investing in cocos, and plan to sell off the equity
immediately upon the unlikely event of a conversion. The latter scenario would likely lead to large scale dumping of financial
institution stock at fire sale prices, damaging confidence in the financial institution and reducing the value of the bank's
capital.

Cocos also create incentives for investors who do not have any interest in the cocos themselves. If the
conversion of cocos into equity suddenly seems likely, the issuing bank's existing shareholders will fear dilution
of their stock holdings. This creates incentives for these shareholders to sell their holdings quickly, even if the
sales are at a discount, further depressing the value of the issuing bank's stock. Speculators witnessing all of
these adverse developments and volatility may become interested in shorting the issuing bank. If speculators
use large amounts of credit derivatives to short the issuing bank, then that can have a multiplying effect on the
increase in the bank's CDS spread. In short, if the markets take the view that the low-probability, high-impact
trigger event is no longer improbable with respect to a particular issuing bank, then that bank is likely to be
subject to increased panic selling and shorting activity.
Coco holders and speculators who have shorted the issuing bank, and even coco holders who have not shorted
the bank but stand to gain more shares upon conversion if the bank's share value is depressed, all have
perverse incentives to engage in manipulative behaviors. These behaviors include taking very large short
positions in the bank (effectively, a bear raid), as well as spreading negative rumors about the bank in an
attempt to drive its stock price down and CDS spread up. Banks that have issued cocos with a market-based
trigger (such as a fall in stock price, or an increase in CDS spread) are particularly susceptible to such
manipulative behaviors, because speculating short-sellers and holders of CDSs are in a position to benefit
themselves by engaging in behaviors that actually set off the trigger. 14
14 The IMF notes that a disadvantage of using market-based triggers is that “Price manipulation (via short-selling) and the
self-fulfilling threat of equity dilution could inflict a confidence-induced downward spiral that eventually triggers conversion.”
Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, Jianping Zhou, Vanessa Le Lesle and Michael Moore, IMF Staff Discussion Note Contingent Capital:
Economic Rationale and Design Features (January 25, 2011), Appendix II, Appendix Table 1.

Cocos and Confidence
Stock prices and CDS spreads are viewed by the markets as important indicia of any company's health, but they
are particularly important in the context of GSIBs. Banking operations tend to be opaque, and their risk profiles
can change very quickly, so there is very little information about banks that is both current and available to the
general public. 15 Even with perfect information, it would be almost impossible for an outsider to properly
evaluate all the permutations and combinations of risk associated with a complex financial institution. 16 It
follows that the markets, already unnerved by the perception that a seemingly unlikely conversion event
suddenly seems possible, will watch with interest as the market prices of the issuing bank's cocos and stock
decline, and the yield on its CDSs increases. These indicators are likely to confirm the markets' suspicions that
the bank is in trouble, whether or not the fundamentals of the issuing bank have in fact deteriorated.
15 The Goldman Sachs Global Markets Institute comments on the “poor quality of available accounting data for banks”.
Louise Pitt, Amanda Hindlian, Sandra Lawson and Charles P. Himmelberg of Goldman Sachs Global Markets Institute,
Contingent Capital: Possibilities, problems and opportunities, (March, 2011) at page 8. Certain bank assets (such as loans
to small businesses) are “particularly opaque and difficult to assess from the outside.” Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo,
Martin F. Hellwig and Paul Pfleiderer, Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why
Bank Equity is Not Expensive, (September 10, 2010 draft) at page 21.
16 In fact, during the Financial Crisis, many of the financial institutions themselves did not have a clear and complete picture
of their operations and risk profiles. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded in its report that “the exposures of
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financial institutions to risky mortgage assets and other potential losses were unknown to market participants, and indeed
many firms did not know their own exposures” [emphasis added]. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis
Inquiry Report (2011) at page 386.

Banks are particularly reliant on confidence for their proper functioning. 17 If the markets perceive that a bank is
in trouble, then counterparties will be wary of providing it with short-term funding without requiring more and
better collateral (effectively, this amounts to a run on the bank's short-term funding). Bear Stearns' experience in
2008 is a cautionary tale, showing that once confidence in a financial institution has been significantly damaged,
counterparties will restrict the availability of the funding that they would ordinarily make available to that
institution. Many banks are unable to function for very long without their customary short-term funding, and so a
funding run would make it more likely that a trigger event would actually occur. 18 Although the issuing bank
would be recapitalized as the cocos convert into equity upon the occurrence of the trigger event, it is quite
possible that the shock of the actual conversion would be so damaging to market confidence in the issuing bank
that it would be unable to reestablish its normal short-term funding sources, notwithstanding its new capital. The
irony of cocos is, thus, that they can precipitate the failure of the very financial institutions they were intended to
help.
17 E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?: Summary, (January, 1982) (available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pu
blications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=684). Raymond Moley (a former advisor to Franklin Roosevelt) noted
somewhat facetiously, but truthfully, that “We knew how much of banking depended upon make-believe or, stated more
conservatively, the vital part that public confidence had in assuring solvency.” Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (1966),
at page 171.
18 The IMF notes that “markets can be distorted, especially during times of stress, and therefore fail to provide the right
signals”, and that with market-based triggers, there is a higher chance of “premature conversions, which lead [to] higher
funding cost”. Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, Jianping Zhou, Vanessa Le Lesle and Michael Moore, IMF Staff Discussion Note
Contingent Capital: Economic Rationale and Design Features (January 25, 2011), Appendix II, Appendix Table 1.

In sum, the novel and distinguishing feature of cocos is that they contain a contractual mechanism that provides
for automatic and irreversible conversion from debt to equity upon the occurrence of a trigger event. Although
the occurrence of a trigger event is unlikely, markets will look on a potential conversion with great trepidation – if
signs are pointing towards conversion, then market confidence in the issuing bank is likely to be damaged. If
confidence is damaged, then this will prompt panic selling, short selling and an increased use of credit
derivatives. These activities will further damage confidence in the bank in a pernicious feedback loop, and this is
likely to impact the ability of the issuing bank to obtain short-term funding, further damaging its already
precarious position. This harm is likely to outweigh the benefits of any recapitalization that a coco can provide.
By ruling out the use of cocos to satisfy increased capital requirements for GSIBs, the BCBS has made this
scenario far less likely to come to fruition. In doing so, the BCBS has most likely done the GSIBs a favor.
Special Report
Electronic Commerce: Regulatory Uncertainty Casts Doubts on Legal Status of Mobile Payments Services
By Paul Barbagallo
The emergence of new technology that enables consumers to pay for things with their smartphones has
exposed shortcomings in the laws governing financial transactions.
As it stands now, no one law or government authority oversees the burgeoning field of mobile commerce. At the
same time, regulators have yet to explain what, how, and to whom existing laws may apply.
The federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, for instance, governs the use of personal information maintained
by financial institutions. The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, along with its 2003 amended version, the Fair
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, establishes rules for access to, and dissemination of, consumer reports.
Regulation E, first issued by the Federal Reserve Board in 1979 under the authority of the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act, provides protection for electronic fund transfers to and from a consumer's bank account.

One thorny issue is whether the laws
and rules that apply to banks, credit
card issuers, and payment networks
should apply to mobile phone carriers

Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits “unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,”
including banking. The Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z,
also promulgated by the Fed, govern credit card transactions,
while the Uniform Commercial Code's Article 4A regulates
business-to-business wire transfers and automated

© 2020 The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Services

// PAGE 69

Banking Report (BNA), 97 BBR Issue No. 11

clearinghouse payments.

and tech companies.

As for the regulator, any number or combination of federal
agencies could theoretically assert jurisdiction over mobile payments, including the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift
Supervision, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, Federal Trade
Commission, the Treasury's Federal Crimes Enforcement Network, and the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau created in July 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation.
State Laws Also Have Bearing
Further complicating matters are a jumble of state laws that apply to non-depository money services providers,
such as “money transmitters,” check cashers, and currency dealers.
“What we're seeing now is something similar to what we saw years ago with the introduction of internet
payments, where everyone was very unsettled about how to apply the laws governing traditional financial
products and services,” said Jessica Sklute, a special counsel at Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP in New York, who
advises clients on banking regulation, payment systems, and financial services law.
At that point in time, the industry worked closely with state and federal regulators to navigate the complexities of
existing laws and regulations in an effort to, as Sklute said, “fit a square peg in a round hole.”
Erring on the side of caution, companies used “common sense,” and frequently applied the existing laws and
regulations governing financial transactions to online transactions, she said.
To some degree, the industry is now taking the same precautions.
But one of the thorniest issues that has emerged is whether the laws and rules that apply to banks, credit card
issuers, and payment networks should also apply to mobile phone carriers and technology companies, which
are all vying to dominate the nascent but growing market, according to lawyers surveyed recently by BNA.
Mobile Phone Just Another ‘Access Device.’
Most lawyers and legal observers believe that mobile phones could be, and should be, considered “access
devices” under Regulation E of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act. The question regulators must answer is
whether an iPhone or Blackberry is in actuality serving as a means for consumers to “access” a personal bank
account to transfer funds electronically. If so, the smartphone would become just another access device, and
the protections under Regulation E would apply.
Under the law, an access device is any “card, code, or other means of access to a consumer's account” to
initiate electronic funds transfers, which include ATM transfers, debit card transactions, direct deposits and
withdrawals, telephone-initiated transfers and online bill payments.
“Using a mobile phone to conduct point-of-sale transactions does not automatically mean that consumers are no
longer protected by federal consumer protection laws,” said Roberta Torian, an attorney with Reed Smith in
Philadelphia specializing in bank regulatory and consumer compliance. “The way the regulation is written,
electronic funds transfer already includes transfers made using a telephone.”
But as of now, Regulation E applies only to banks, savings associations, credit unions, or “any other person that
directly or indirectly holds an account belonging to a consumer, or that issues an access device and agrees with
a consumer to provide electronic funds transfers, or EFTs, services.”
The rules require financial institutions to make certain disclosures about the terms and conditions of EFTs and,
according to experts, will likely apply even when consumers wave their smartphones at retail terminals. To
whom the regulation will apply, however, is still uncertain.
Should Regulation E Apply to Wireless Carriers?
Timothy McTaggart, a partner in the Washington office of Pepper Hamilton LLP, said the issue presents an
interesting question to federal regulators.
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The Fed has yet to make clear whether wireless carriers are subject to Regulation E as EFT “service providers.”
If so, Verizon Wireless or AT&T Inc., for example, would be required to make most of the same disclosures
currently required of financial institutions under Regulation E.
The rules, as promulgated, define EFT service providers as institutions that issue an access device to, and
provide EFT services for, consumers, but that do not hold consumers' bank accounts.
For the Fed to extend Regulation E to wireless carriers, regulators would have to first define mobile phones as
access devices and then view the “data” transmitted over their networks as “EFT services,” McTaggart said.
“In mobile commerce, there has been this interesting convergence of the telecom and the banking financial
services sectors; they are each in their own separate spheres of regulatory processes and enforcement,” noted
McTaggart, who focuses his practice on bank and financial services regulatory matters. “Those are not really
harmonized. The question becomes: What conduct should be reviewed and evaluated and who does it?”
Even existing mobile payment services providers, like PayPal, have fallen into a Regulation E gray area. And
the Fed has never clarified whether such providers are subject to Regulation E.
In the absence of guidance, however, PayPal has operated under the assumption that its service is, and will be,
subject to Regulation E.
According to PayPal's User Agreement, the company provides “advance disclosure” of changes to its service,
follows “specified error resolution” procedures, and reimburses consumers for losses above $50 from
“transactions not authorized by the consumer.”
Mobile Carriers as Creditors?
Although Regulation E may apply to transactions where the consumer swipes his smartphone on a retail
terminal and the charge is immediately deducted from a “linked” checking account, other mobile transactions
are more difficult to place within the current regulatory framework.
For example, when a consumer pays for a cashmere sweater with her mobile phone, which is linked to a credit
card account, or any line of credit, several questions arise: Who resolves billing errors? Which entity should
make the requisite Regulation Z disclosures? Who assumes the risk of unauthorized transactions?
Even more problematic for regulators are services that allow consumers to make purchases online by entering
their mobile phone number.
A start-up called Boku offers such a service. The way it works is that the company sends a text message to the
buyer asking for transaction authorization with a texted response. The charge then appears on the next mobile
phone bill. Boku takes a percentage and the wireless carriers, with whom consumers have an established
relationship, take a percentage.
Two other companies, Zong and PaymentOne, offer similar services.
In August, PaymentOne announced that it had officially processed $5 billion in “micropayment” transactions.
The company and European mobile network operator Telefónica also recently entered into a deal that will allow
Telefónica's Germany subscribers to charge products and services up to 30 euros (about $41) directly to their
mobile phone bill.
Battle to Create ‘Sticky Customers.'
Brad Singer, executive vice president of PaymentOne, told BNA that while the service has been popular with
consumers, most purchases have been nominal, for anything from movie tickets to digital music downloads to
highway tolls.
“The wireless carriers' business has become very competitive,” Singer noted in a recent interview with BNA. “So
the ability to keep a customer, if you're an AT&T or Verizon, and prevent customers from switching to another
provider is critical. The retention value of allowing subscribers to pay for music or movies or a New York Times
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subscription creates a ‘sticky customer.’ The value-add creates that stickiness.”
Some critics have suggested that the wireless carriers and micropayment services providers, by circumventing
the payment networks of Visa and MasterCard, are in effect extending credit and should be subject to the Truth
in Lending Act and Regulation Z.
In absence of a clarification from the Fed, such services offered by Boku, Zong, and PaymentOne, among
others, will continue to raise questions about whether consumers will be protected, according to Michele Jun,
senior attorney for Consumers Union.
No Credit Card-Like Protections in Service Contracts
“With a credit card, as a consumer, you have the ability to make disputes and withhold payment,” Jun said. “But
with charges that appear on your wireless bill, you don't. You're stuck with the terms and conditions outlined by
wireless carrier in the [service] contract.”
“If a charge was for the wrong amount or if your phone is stolen and there is fraud, you only have the
protections in the contract,” she added. “There are no statutory protections. It would be up to the micropayments
services provider or wireless carrier to conduct an investigation.”
Jun said that she expects purchases to extend further into the “real world,” beyond just $1 or $2 games,
graphics, or ring tones, which cost consumers.
When that happens, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Federal Trade Commission may pay
closer attention.
“Crisis is what brings about the most significant changes most rapidly,” said Carol Van Cleef, an attorney at
Patton Boggs representing financial services companies in federal and state regulatory, compliance, and
enforcement matters. “Absent some sort of major event dealing with mobile payments, the laws will continue to
evolve in fits and starts over the next three to five years.”
FCC May Have Role to Play
Until then, state regulators and Federal Communications Commission may have a role to play. The FCC's Truth
in Billing rules require telecommunications companies to separate local charges from long-distance charges on
monthly billing statements; under a pending rulemaking, the same requirements would apply for non-“common
carrier” services. These might include games, graphics, or ring tones, and even big-screen TVs and clothing, if
more consumers decide to pile up purchases on their cellphone bills.
But much like with Regulation E, the Fed has not stated whether Regulation Z applies to mobile payments or to
mobile phone carriers and high-tech companies.
As written, Regulation Z applies to “each individual or business that offers or extends credit” and will likely
continue to apply to any mobile transactions in which a personal credit card is linked to a mobile phone. After all,
a creditor is still issuing credit.
To some critics, by allowing consumers to charge purchases to their cellphone bills, wireless carriers are
engaging in unlicensed “money transmission.”
Forty-eight states currently have statutes governing money transmission. At the federal level, “money services
businesses,” those businesses offering “check cashing, money orders, travelers checks, money transfers,
currency dealing or exchange, and pre-paid access products” are subject to the Bank Secrecy Act.
The first question regulators must ask then is whether a wireless carrier is “transmitting” money.
‘Money Service’ v. ‘Communications Service.’
“Providing money service is not communications,” Benjamin Geva, a law professor at Osgoode Hall Law School
at York University in Toronto, told BNA. “The [mobile phone] carrier is facilitating the communication for the
provision of the money service, but the money service itself is not communications. It's a completely separate
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thing.”
Geva said the advent of “mobile wallets” will necessitate regulations that account for the various roles of all the
participants—the mobile phone carriers, credit card issuers, payment networks, and technology
companies—and “allocate losses.”
Earlier this month, Canadian mobile network operator Rogers filed to become a bank under Canada's federal
Bank Act, which will allow the company to offer more mobile payment services to customers.
Now, as an unambiguous “bank,” Rogers can freely to launch its own mobile wallet with financial services
partners, Visa and TD Bank.
In the United States, Verizon, AT&T, and T-Mobile USA have partnered to form an initiative known as Isis, to
offer customers the ability to digitize—and mobilize—their wallets.
The companies' original plan was to allow consumers to make purchases just with their phones, without any
linked checking account or credit card, much like a Boku or Zong.
‘Mobile Wallets' Are Coming
But according to sources familiar with the carriers' thinking, the group decided instead to push the mobile wallet
concept, in which customers' debit and credit card information would be encrypted in their phones.
“The wireless carriers will do anything they possibly could to derive more revenue from their networks, right up
to the point of being regulated, but they can't figure out where that line is now,” one source told BNA.
In the United States, however, the current laws are designed prevent a Verizon or AT&T from doing what
Rogers did in Canada.
The Bank Holding Company Act, enacted in the 1950s, prohibits the mingling of banking and commerce and
generally limits non-banking institutions from controlling banks.
If a company, like Verizon or AT&T, for instance, were to acquire a bank, all of its business activities would have
to be banking activities or closely related to banking activities.
EU Template Eyed
Terrence Maher, a partner at Baird Holm in Omaha, Neb., said one of the looming questions for policymakers is
whether to create a regulatory regime at the federal level similar to that of Europe, where wireless carriers can
become so-called “E-money” providers.
Telefónica O2 UK is planning to apply for an E-money license with the United Kingdom Financial Services
Authority, which would enable the company to issue prepaid, stored-value, applications.
If approved, Telefónica would be able to offer consumers the option to pay merchants by tapping their
smartphones at the physical point of sale, or to conduct person-to-person transfers over the mobile network.
Maher explained that E-money services providers are not “full-fledged” banks, but rather are licensed and
regulated like banks.
“To be a member of any of the payment networks, you have to be a federally or state-chartered financial
institution in the United States,” said Maher. “In Europe, where they have the E-Money directive, providers of EMoney services can also be members of Visa and MasterCard and can participate in issuing E-Money products
that operate on Visa and MasterCard networks. In the United States, that's currently not possible. All the
payment networks—both credit card networks and debit networks—require that members be financial
institutions.”
As of now, there is no scheme in the United States for a non-financial institution, like a Verizon or AT&T, to
accept “deposits,” which is essentially what Telefónica proposes to do in launching mobile wallet services.
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“What will see is an evolution of regulation to meet these very quickly evolving business models,” Robert Pile, a
partner at Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, told BNA. “At the same time, it doesn't seem to be really standing in
the way of [companies] bringing these products and services to market, and it's not like things that are being
done are so radically different than what has happened in the past. A payment made or a money transfer via
cellphone still would trip up a number of regulations that would have existed had it been a different form of
transmission of that payment. Now we've put a cellphone in the middle of it.”
Analysis & Perspective
Securitization: Uncertainty Surrounding Risk-Retention Rules Contributes to Lagging Securitization Markets
BNA Snapshot
What It Does: Rule would force securitizers to retain some of the risk from the asset-backed securities they issue.
Potential Impact: Designed to discourage securitization of poorly underwritten loans, but may increase asset-backed
securities cost.

By Richard Cowden
The task of issuing a final Dodd-Frank risk-retention rule covering all asset classes is proving a daunting task
that may require a year to complete, and in the meantime the still-staggering securitization industry remains in
limbo, according to industry observers.
Section 941 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act addresses one of the
critical concerns about securitization: how to support a risk transfer-based loan funding system without fostering
reckless behavior on the part of those who issue the securities. Rulemakers must tailor a myriad of key
provisions to each of several asset classes, ranging from auto loans to student loans to commercial real estate
loans, that often take vastly different paths to securitization.
Further, all of the rules must win approval by several agencies involved in the interagency rulemaking, each of
which has its own set of priorities.
Also, due in part to the many parties with an interest in the regulatory outcome, the March 29 release of the noti
ce of proposed rulemaking (NPR) elicited scores of responses, many of which offer extensive comments.
Comment Deadline Extended
At the urging of the private sector, the regulators extended the comment deadline from June 1 to Aug. 1. They
are analyzing comments and meeting with several groups that could be affected by the new rules. That is
turning out to be a labor-intensive assignment.
“The extension suggests they did not fully appreciate the gravity of what they were proposing,” Shekar
Narasimhan, chief executive officer of the merchant bank Beekman Helix, told BNA Sept. 12.
Throughout September, each of the agencies (Federal Reserve Board, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury Department,
Federal Housing Finance Agency, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development) will form its own
views on whether and how the proposal should be altered. Treasury oversees the process, but does not have a
vote. HUD and FHFA are involved only in the housing provisions of the rulemaking.
The regulators will work together through October and November to formulate a response to the comments,
according to industry sources, who said they expect a final rule to emerge sometime during the first quarter of
2012.
“I think everyone is going to stall a little bit, which is fair, given that they have a huge volume of comments,”
Narasimhan said.
Reproposal Possible
Michael Flood, vice president of legislative and regulatory policy at the Commercial Real Estate Finance Council
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